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Abstract
In this study we explore the determinants of part-time labor supply
for Spanish households using data from EPA. We develop a model of
the household where the woman’s contribution to family income af-
fects her power in the collective decision unit. Our aim is to estimate
the importance of part-time employment as an instrument to increase
women’s participation and to what extent part-time employment re-
sponds to traditional views of gender family obligations.
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1 Introduction
Part-time employment is an employment option for many women that would
otherwise be out of the labor market, yet in some countries the results of
part-time employment policies on women’s participation have not been as
succesful as expected. The rise of part-time jobs and women’s participation
during the last decades is a labor market feature shared by many developed
countries, but there are still important diﬀerences in levels across countries,
both in part-time employment and in women’s participation. For instance,
the share of part-time jobs in total employment varies from a 23.3 per cent
in UK to 5.6 per cent in Greece with, overall, higher levels in Northen Eu-
ropean countries. Participation rates follow a similar pattern: Southern
EU countries like Spain, Italy and Greece show lower rates than Northen
countries (see Table 1). The availability of part-time jobs is just one as-
pect of more flexible labor markets, and it usually comes along with other
measures like work-family programs, child-care public services, and better
maternal-leave policies, which can be very diﬀerent from one country to an-
other. Moreover, individuals’ attitudes toward work practices and unions’
preferences are also reflected in labor market regulations and employment
policies, so it is not surprising that we find large variations in part-time em-
ployment shares across developed countries and even that similar part-time
employment policies can yield very diﬀerent outcomes across countries.
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Figure 1: Part-time employment shares for some OECD countries. Data
source: Statistical Annex 2004.
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One of the most important issues in recent debates on part-time em-
ployment is the existence in some countries of large hourely earnings dif-
ferentials between part-time and full-time jobs after controlling for job and
worker’s characteristics. Bardasi and Gornick (2002) analyse this problem
in six developed countries. They find that a part-time worker in the US
earns 17.1 percent less than a full-time worker, followed by Italy with 14.4
percent, Canada with 9.3 percent, Germany with 7.7 percent, and the UK
with 1.1 percent. The exception is Sweden where a part-time worker earns
2.8 percent more than a full-time worker. To the extent that, on average,
more than 80 percent of part-time jobs are held by women and that these
earnings diﬀerentials cannot be explained by observable characteristics, this
evidence suggests that in some countries part-time jobs can be a hidden
form of gender diﬀerentials in earnings.
Therefore the relationship between part-time employment and the par-
ticipation of women in the labor market is influenced or conditioned by
multiple factors that might lead in some countries to the result that a part-
time job is not an employment option. We can go further and ask whether
higher participation rates of women are the cause, rather than the conse-
quence, of higher shares of part-time jobs in total employment. That is, is
it a larger presence of women in the labor market that pushes up more and
better part-time jobs? Is part-time employment supply or demand driven?
In this work we explore the relationship between women’s participation
and part-time employment accross Spanish households and try to answer
some of these questions. Our aim is to investigate to what extent tradi-
tional gender roles within a household are responsible for a part-time labor
supply that is mainly a woman’s supply. With this aim we develop a model
of the household where parents have some beliefs about the traditional di-
vision of labor between market and non-market production, and where the
relative gender weights in the collective decision process is influenced by
each agent’s market earnings. We think Spain is an interesting case of study
because the participation rate of women has been increasing steadily since
the eighties, but the increase in part-time employment has been very weak in
comparison with the pattern followed by Northen countries. With this aim
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we first develop a collective model of the household where agents (parents)
have to decide how to allocate their productive time between market work
and housework. The purpose is to study the interaction between the labor
market decisions of women and the balance of power within the family. .
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present some
data about Spanish part-time employment trying to identify the main (indi-
vidual and family) factors that shape the labor supply of married women. In
Section 3 we develop a model of the household and analyze how households
with similar characteristics can end up in very diﬀerent situations regarding
the woman’s labor supply. In Section 4 we shall include the results concern-
ing the estimation of the model. And finally some concluding remarks will
be the content of Section 5.
2 Some features of part-time employment in Spain
As mentioned in the Introduction the main features of part-time employ-
ment in Spain are similar to those in other OECD countries –part-time
employment is concentrated on the service sector and among the female
population–.but part-time employment is still a rare phenomenon in Spain,
as well as in other Sourtern EU countries (like Italy or Greece). In this Sec-
tion we want explore the main reasons for the supply of part-time employ-
ment across Spanish households using data from EPA 2000. An important
short cut of this data source is that does not include information about
wages or other family income sources, but it does contain very valuable and
detail information about individual preferences over workweek lengths.
The EPA survey gives us some relevant information about the reasons
why men and women have part-time employment. Table 2 summarizes how
these reasons are distributted within each gender (% Col.) and across men
and women (% Row) employed part-time. For instance, 47.4 percent of
workers who have part-time because they are undertaking some education
or training program are men and the rest are women; whereas 13.7 percent
of men and 4.2 percent of women have it for that reason. It is clear from
this Table that among workers that choose part-time work because they
have family obligations men represent a very small share (1.2 percent) com-
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Education, training 47.4 13.7  52.6 4.2  
Illness 60.0 3.0  40.0 0.6  
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Full-Time not found 22.0 22.5  78.0 21.9  
Full-Time not wanted 16.1 4.1  83.9 5.9  
Type of activity 20.9 37.0  79.1 38.2  
Other 26.3 18.1  73.7 13.9  
Unknown reason 13.1 0.9  86.9 1.7  
 
Figure 2: Reasons for Part-Time Employment across Spanish Households.
Data Source: EPA 2000.
pared with that of women (98.8 percent), which reveals the unequal gender
distribution of family duties. The data also show that among those workers
that have not found a full-time employment the majority are women (78
percent), which could be interpreted as evidence that it is easier for men to
get a full-time job. Moreover, the fact that most of part-time workers that
do not want a full-time job are also women (83.9 percent) is probabbly the
consequence of women being in households where men hold ‘good’ full-time
jobs.
Our aim is to investigate to what extent traditional gender roles within
a household are responsible for a part-time labor supply that is mainly a
woman’s supply. With this aim we develop in the next Section a model of
the household where parents have some beliefs about the traditional division
of labor between market and family (non-market) production activities, and
then estimate the results of the model in Section 4.
3 A model of the household
Consider a household composed by two productive adults, a woman and
a man, and a fixed number of dependent children. Each productive adult
has a unit of productive time that can be distributted between working in
the market and working at home. Agents obtain utility from two kinds of
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goods, a market good and a home good that cannot be traded in the market.
Household time employed at home, h, generates a home good according with
the following production technology:
z (h) = Aeh, (1)
We shall assume that the home good is a public good inside the household,
so that (1) also represents the consumption of the home good of each family
member.
A household or a family is a collective decision unit where dependent
agents do not have any decision power. Denoting by 1 − µ the woman’s
weight in the collective decision unit, the objetive of the household is to
maximize the following weighted sum of individual utilities,
(1− µ)Uf + µUm, (2)
subject to the home technology (1), the budget constraint,
c · n = Y +wf lf +wmlm, (3)
and the time constraint,
h = 2− lf − lm. (4)
Where c · n represents total household’s consumption of the market good,
Y is household’s non-labor real income, wi is the real wage of adult i, and
li is the time individual i works in the market, woman = f , man = m.
So equation (3) establishes that the household’s consumption of the market
good has to be financed out of total household’s income, whereas equation
(4) establishes that working time at home is determined by the household’s
endowment of productive time minus the working time spent in the market.
We suppose that utilities are identical across agents except for a term
that captures an individual’s belief in the social custom. The social custom,
or social norm, in our context says that the husband should preferentially
work more time in the market than the wife. Accordingly, we assume that
the utility function of individual adult i is given by:
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Ui = log c+ δ (n) log z − si · (lf − lm) , (5)
δ (n) > 0, δ´ ≥ 0, si ≥ 0.
That is, an adult cares about per capita consumption of both goods within
the family, and about the social custom if si > 0. The term δ (n) represents
the weight of the home good in the agents’ utility as a non-decreasing func-
tion of family size. With this assumption we want to capture the idea that
parents can be more concerned about the home good as the family rises.
Or, in other words, the marginal utility of working at home increases with
family size.
3.1 The collective labor supply
In this section we solve the problem of the household assuming that the
weighting power factor µ is given to the colective decision unit. Substituting
the constraints (1), (3) and (4) into the objetive (2), and solving for the
collective labor supplies of individuals, it is easy to show that an interior
solution must satisfy the following conditions:
wf
Y +wf lf +wmlm
= δ (n) + (1− µ) sf + µsm , (6)
wm
Y +wf lf +wmlm
= δ (n)− (1− µ) sf − µsm (7)
The right side of (6) represents the household’s marginal cost in terms of
utility of the woman’s time in the market, while the left side represents the
corresponding marginal utility gain, given that the woman and the man
spend, respectively, lf and lm time in the market. It is clear, then, that if
the right side of (6) is larger than its left side, the woman’s labor supply
will be zero. And that if the right side of (6) is smaller than its left side, the
woman’s labor supply will be one. A similar argument follows from (7) for
the man’s labor supply.
Note that, by assumption, the right side of (7) is smaller than or equal
to the right side of (6) and so the marginal cost of the woman’s market
6
time will never be below that of the man. As a result, if the woman’s wage
is not larger than the man’s, then the household’s optimal time allocation
implies that the woman will never spend more time in the market than the
man. This result is consistent with the empirical evidence presented above
for developed countries where the majority of employed men hold full-time
jobs. Let y denote total family income when the man works full-time and
the woman is out of the labor market, Y +wm. Then, the following condition
guarantees that the man in our model will work always full-time.
Condition 1 δ (n)− (1− µ) sf − µsm < wmY+wf+wm .
Under Condition 1 we can express the woman’s labor supply as follows:
lsf =



1 if δ (n) + (1− µ) sf + µsm ≤ wfy+wfel ∈ (0, 1) if wfy+wf < δ (n) + (1− µ) sf + µsm < wfy
0 if δ (n) + (1− µ) sf + µsm ≥ wfy
(8)
Figure 1 illustrates these three possibilities for given wages and family
incomes. The horizontal lines represent, respectively, the marginal cost of
the woman’s market time, δ (n)+(1− µ) sf+µsm, in each possible situation.
The solid line represents a suﬃciently low marginal cost so that the woman’s
labor supply is one (i.e.: E1 represents the full-time case); the dotted line
represents a marginal cost that is so high that the woman’s labor supply is
zero (i.e.: E3 represents the non-participation case); and finally the dashed
line stands for an intermediate marginal cost that equals the marginal utility
gain of working in the market at a point where the woman’s labor supply
is positive but less than one (i.e.: E2 represents a part-time solution). Note
that, everything else the same, a larger n tends to decrease the amount of
time supplied to the market because the marginal cost in terms of utility
of working in the market rises with n and so the horizontal line δ (n) +
(1− µ) sf + µsm shifts upwards. However, a larger man’s weight in the
collective decision unit, µ, can increase or decrease the marginal cost of
market time depending on whether sm − sf is positive or negative.
If the man were more concerned about the social custom than the woman,
sm > sf , an increase (decrease) in µ will shift the marginal cost line upwards
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Figure 3: The female collective labor supply
(downwards) and so, everything else the same, the amount of time supplied
to the market will tend to be lower (larger). On the contrary, if the woman
were more concerned about the social custom than the man, these eﬀects
will be reversed.
In any case, notice that the woman will be out of the labor force for any
value of µ if the term δ (n) is suﬃciently large relative to wf/y. So we shall
focus the analysis on the more interesting case where the following condition
is satisfied:
Condition 2 δ (n) < wf/y.
We are interested in the household’s welfare ranking over the possible
workweek lengths. Given (8), it is not diﬃcult to show that if full-time is
the most prefered option, then part-time employment is prefered to non-
employment. But when working part-time is the most prefered option,
non-working can be better than working full-time. The following Propo-
sition summarizes the household’s ranking over these employment options
for diﬀerent parameter specifications.
Proposition 3 Under Conditions 1 and 2, the household’s preferences over
the woman’s workweek length are the following:
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(i) Working part-time is the most prefered option if wfwf+y < δ (n)+(1− µ) sf+
µsm < wfy . In this case, working full-time is prefered to non-working if and
only if log
³
wf+y
y
´
≥ δ (n) + (1− µ) sf + µsm.
(iii) Working full-time is the most prefered option and working part-time
is prefered to non-working if log
³
wf+y
y
´
≥ δ (n) + (1− µ) sf + µsm and
wf
wf+y > δ (n) + (1− µ) sf + µsm.
(iii) Non-working is the most prefered option if δ (n)+(1− µ) sf+µsm > wfy .
3.2 The equilibrium of the household
In this section we suppose that the woman’s power in the collective decision
unit can be aﬀected by her contribution to the household’s earnings. In
particular, we shall assume that µ is a decreasing function of the woman’s
labor income, µ (wf lf ), that takes values on the interval
£
µ, µ
¤
, 0 ≤ µ <
µ ≤ 1.
For given wages, non-labor income and a level of µ, the woman’s collec-
tive labor supply will be given by (8), but this optimal allocation of time
can cause a change in the factor µ and the household may want to ad-
just lsf further. We follow Basu (2004) and define the equilibrium of the
household as a stationary solution to this process. That is, the process will
continue until a pair
³
l∗f , µ∗
´
is attained where l∗f satisfies (8) for given µ∗,
and µ∗ = µ
³
wf l∗f
´
. In other words, we can interpret the equilibrium of the
household as the outcome of an itterative process in which current labor
income determines tomorrow’s distribution of power within the household.
As we mentioned before, the woman’s colletive labor supply given by (8)
will be non-increasing in µ if the man is more concerned about the social
custom than the woman, sm > sf . Otherwise, the woman’s labor supply
will be non-decreasing in the factor µ. For illustration purposes, consider
first the case sm > sf and take a household where depending on the value
of µ the woman could work full-time, work part-time or not work at all.
That is, given wages, non-labor income and preference types, there exists
a value of µ above which the woman’s labor supply is zero, and a value of
µ below which the woman’s labor supply is one. The solid schedule in the
following Figures represents the relationship between lsf and µ obtained from
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Figure 4: The household’s part-time equilibrium is stable and unique
(8) assuming sm > sf , which is called the earnings-curve; and the dotted
line represents the power function µ (wf lf ). So the intersection of both lines
will determine the equilibrium of the household. Notice that Figures 2, 3,
4 and 5 show only some of the possible outcomes and that, in principle, we
cannot rule out the existence of multiple equilibria. Moreover, when the
full-time case or the inactivity case arise as an equilibrium of the household,
they are always stable solutions, whereas the part-time case can be stable or
unstable. To see this consider first Figure 2, where the part-time equilibrium
is unique and stable: pick a value of µ below µ∗, say µ0, then the earnings-
curve will give us the optimal allocation of time lsf (µ0), which in turn will
cause an increase in the factor µ through the power-curve; the new value of
the man’s power factor µ1 will cause a further adjustment of the woman’s
collective supply towards lsf (µ∗) = l∗f . Similarly, if we pick a value of µ
above µ∗, the household’s optimal allocation of time will converge to l∗f and
the power weighting factor will converge to µ∗.
In Figure 3 the power-curve is such that it cuts the earnings-curve at
three points. In this case we have two part-time equilibria –one stable as
in Figure 4 and another one allocating more time to market production that
is unstable– and a stable full-time equilibrium. At the full-time equilibrium
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Figure 5: The household’s full-time equilibrium is stable, a part-time equi-
librium can be stable or unstable
the man’s power weighting factor attains its minimum value µ∗3 = µ. The
household will be at the unstable part-time equilibrium only if the initial
power factor happens to be there, µ0 = µ∗2, but any small perturbation will
cause the household to move the allocation of time towards a stable equilib-
rium. Which equilibrium prevails as the household’s choice will depend on
the initial value of the power weighting factor.
Figure 4 shows the case where there is a unique and stable household’s
equilibrium that corresponds to the full-time case. In Figures 5 and 6 below
the power-curve does not cut the earnings-curve from below and as a con-
sequence non-participation arises as a household equilibrium. As before, if
there are multiple equilibria, the one prevailing as the household’s choice will
depend on the initial man’s power in the decision process. In Figure 5 there
is a stable equilibrium characterized by non-participation, and a part-time
unstable and a full-time stable equilibria as in Figure 3.
In Figure 6 the unique stable household equilibrium is that of non-
participation: the woman remains out of the labor force and the man’s
power in the collective decision unit attains its maximum value µ∗ = µ.
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Figure 6: The household’s full-time equilibrium is unique and stable.
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Figure 7: The household’s non-participation and full-time equilibria are
stable, the part-time equilibrium is unstable
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Figure 8: The household’s non-particiapation equilibrium is estable and
unique, the man’s power decision factor is at its maximum value
In summary, if the man is more concerned about the social custom than
the woman, there can be multiple household equilibria, which one prevails
will depend on the initial weight of the man’s power in the decision process.
The full-time equilibrium and non-working equilibrium are always stable,
but the part-time solution can be stable or unstable. In contrast, it is easy
to show, following the same steps as before, that if the woman is more con-
cerned about the social custom than the man, sf > sm, the household’s
equilibrium (full-time, part-time or non-working) is always unique and sta-
ble.
4 The statistical model
To be completed.
5 Conclusion
To be completed.
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